Abstract. When several databases with multilevel security policies are federated to form a tightly coupled federated database management system, heterogeneities such as different accreditation ranges must be overcome. This paper describes an extended methodology to integrate policies that use different lattices as accreditation ranges. A semi-automatic process obtains the federated accreditation range and needed translation functions among accreditation ranges in order to be validated by the security administrator. The multilevel federated security system, which ensures data confidentiality, is also described.
Introduction
There is a growing need to interoperate several information sources, such as DataBases (DBs), to satisfy the demanding requirements of users. Technically, this is accomplished by superimposing a new system, a Federated DB Management System (FDBMS), as a layer of software upon the Data Base Management Systems (DBMSs) of each one of the pre-existing
DBs, then called Component DBs (CDBs).
Security is a big concern in such an environment. Each CDB has its own security policy, enforced thru its own security mechanisms, to protect its data from unauthorized access. It joins the Federated system if its autonomy can be preserved, and wants to ensure that user queries coming from the FDBMS do not compromise the security of its data. These differences in security policies, models and mechanisms among the CDBs form the security heterogeneity, which comes in addition to the system, syntactic and semantic heterogeneities among them (see [SL90] ), which are out of the scope of this paper.
A FDBMS can federate a number of CDBs using a Discretionary Access Control (DAC) security model -common in business data processing-, while other CDBs are required to use a more strict Mandatory Access Control (MAC) model, particularly in the form of MultiLevel Security (MLS, [BL75] ).
In this environment, the CDBs that apply MLS systems would not easily accept to share information under the control of a DAC system, because those CDBs would want information flow under control. In addition, DAC systems are not powerful enough to avoid unauthorized logical inference and aggregation, and are subject to Trojan Horse attacks ([Per93] ).
Consequently, it is up to the FDBMS to have mechanisms to protect interoperation among several CDBs, using or not using MLS, at the highest level of security, i.e. in terms of MLS.
Our work is related to tightly coupled FDBMS, in the sense of [SL90] . In such systems, there is a federated administrator, and one or more federated schemas; they are of help in enforcing security. Among the subsystems forming the FDBMS, the one in charge of security will use, as explained above, MLS, and is called the MultiLevel Federated Security System (MLFSS); this subsystem is described in this paper.
Even for those CDBs based on the MAC and MLS mechanisms, there are lots of heterogeneities among them, particularly in their accreditation ranges ([MLTS92] , [DJ94] ). The number of classification levels will be different, as will be their names; the dominance relation among levels may be a total order or a partial order; frequently a lattice.
Another objective of this work consists of extending our previous methodology to integrate multilevel security policies (using total ordered sets), to integrate multilevel security policies that use lattices as accreditation ranges. As a result of this work we are able to integrate any set of MLS DBs. This paper is organized as follows. Our schema integration process is summarized in section 2, and an overview of our integration methodology, among multilevel security policies that use total ordered set as accreditation ranges, in section 3. Sections 4 and 5, the core of the paper, present the extended methodology to integrate multilevel security policies that use lattices as accreditation ranges, and how this methodology is embodied in our proposed multilevel federated security system, respectively. Section 6 includes related work. Conclusions, acknowledgements and references close the paper.
Schema integration process summary
When several DBs decide to share their data they can use several interoperation ways. Since we are interested in tightly coupled federations, we follow a building methodology like that presented by [SL90] by means of their 5-level schema architecture. In this case the integration process is based on our 7-level schema architecture ( [ROSC97] ), where one of the additional schemas (Authorization Schema) is related to security aspects. Another important aspect to note is that we use BarceLona Object-Oriented Model (BLOOM, [AR00]) as Canonical Data Model (CDM) of the federation.
From the point of view of maintaining data confidentiality, it is necessary to extend several processors between schemas in our 7-level schema architecture (see figure 1) . First of all, when the Conversion Processors convert schemas expressed in data models different from BLOOM into BLOOM schemas to obtain the Component Schemas, it is essential to maintain the classification of data, which depends on native accreditation ranges of security levels. Thus, it is also necessary to deduce the classification of the components obtained by the semantic enrichment process ( [CSGS94] ), to maintain the confidentiality of data and to prevent possible inferences. Through the negotiation process administrators decide which data of which confidentiality will be offered to the federation in the form of Export Schemas. 
Our methodology to integrate multilevel security policies
Our proposed semi-automatic methodology, presented in [OS00] , to integrate multilevel security policies and to solve their heterogeneities collaborates with the schema integration process summarized in the previous section. We use the term semi-automatic because this process needs to be validated by the Security Administrator of the federation.
The methodology was developed, at first stage, to integrate MLS CDBs that apply total ordered sets as accreditation ranges, for instance (S 1 , ≤ 1 ) and (S 2 , ≤ 2 ) (see figure 2.a). To detect the relationships among security levels belonging to different ordered sets it uses the following information:
a) The confidentiality of data stored in the Export Schemas (see the classification of the components of each CDB schema in fig. 2 .a).
b) The similarities between components of different Export Schemas, obtained by the schema integration process, these are more precisely, Equivalence Semantic
Relationships (E-SRs) and Specialization Semantic Relationships (S-SRs) (see fig. 2 .a). Then, the multidigraph is analyzed to detect incompatible arcs. Two arcs are incompatible if their existence breaks the dominance relation between security levels of the initial ordered sets.
A penalization approach is used to automatically solve incompatibilities losing the least number of arcs. The penalization approach is based on the detection of cycles with more than two participant vertices. An arc accumulates as many penalizations as the number of cycles it is involved in. For instance, in figure 2.b, the arc (L13, L22) is involved in 3 cycles and produces 3 incompatibilities (see fig. 2 .c).
After that, the most penalized arc is removed and the penalization of the arcs are calculated again, repeating this process until the remaining arcs do not have any penalization. When there is no incompatibility, the resulting multidigraph is converted into an ordered set to be used as 
Lattices integration methodology
As pointed out in the introduction of this paper, in MLS systems sometimes the dominance relation among security levels forms a partial ordered set or a lattice. The main characteristics of a lattice are that a greatest and a least element, among all elements forming the lattice, exist.
Because of all ordered sets also have greatest and least elements they are lattices as well.
Besides, as we can always include a fictitious greatest element as well as a fictitious least element into the set of elements forming a partial ordered set, then we can also work with partial ordered sets as they were lattices. So, a methodology that allows integrating lattices will also be able to integrate total and partial ordered sets.
Taking into account the integration methodology of multilevel security policies summarized in the previous section, the main difference between ordered set integration and lattice integration is the set of possible incompatibilities that can be obtained after building the corresponding multidigraph. In subsection 4.1 these possible incompatibilities are analyzed.
After that, subsection 4.2 covers the penalization approach and the set of criteria used to solve the incompatibilities. Finally, three special cases that need a different automatic solution are treated in subsection 4.3.
Incompatibilities
From the point of view of possible incompatibilities, the difference between an ordered set and a lattice is the presence, in the latter, of no comparable elements. As a result, apart from incompatibilities originated by cycles produced by more than two vertices, another incompatibility is produced when the multidigraph contains a path between two incomparable security levels, belonging to the same lattice, which implies a dominance relation between them. produces a path. Because of this path relates two no comparable levels, belonging to the same lattice, it causes an incompatibility (see fig. 3 .b).
Penalization approach
Following the same penalization approach as in the methodology that integrates total ordered sets, each arc of the multidigraph (originated by the representation of the possible dominance relations between security levels of lattices) accumulates as many penalizations as the number of cycles and paths it is involved in.
After penalizing all arcs involved in cycles or in paths, the process uses the following criteria to decide which arc is the best to remove:
1. Look for the most penalized arc.
2. If there is more than one arc with the same greatest penalization, then the one that appears the least number of times is removed. Remember that we use a multidigraph because the same arc can be added several times, depending on the times that the schema integration process finds similarities that produce the same dominance relation between two security levels.
3. If it is possible to apply neither the first nor the second criterion, then the process chooses the arc that relates more confidential levels. Generally, it is easier to share less confidential than more confidential data.
Once an arc is removed, the penalization of the arcs are calculated again, and the previous process is repeated until all penalized arcs disappear. 
Special cases
In spite of the criteria described in previous section, there are three special cases that need a specific treatment. In all of these special cases there is at least a path between two no comparable levels, but it only passes through a unique level belonging to the other lattice.
Although it is impossible to apply any of those criteria to solve the incompatibility, there is a different semi-automatic solution. Note that, in a MLS DB, the set of elements classified at one of the no comparable levels has nothing in common with the set of elements classified at the other one. So, it is possible to consider the set of elements classified at the level through which the path passes just as two different subsets. These subsets can be identified by means of the 
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Cars Employees figure 7 .a shows the special case where there are two no comparable levels of the first lattice that are related with the same level of the second lattice. Thus, because the relation is an equivalent relation in both cases, it would imply that the L23 and L22 levels would be the same level (in this case L12). We avoid this by splitting L12 into L12a and L12b
(because of the reason explained above), and including them, together with L12, in the resultant FAR (see figure 7.b). This is because each federated user only has to be assigned one clearance level, and at the same time, interoperation access using this clearance level has to comply with the autonomy and security principles of [GQ96] . In addition, FAR in figure 7.b includes a fictitious Federated Bottom (FB) security level, like the inclusion of FT in figure 6.c.
Remember that the principle of autonomy and of security ([GQ96]) say, respectively, that any access permitted within an individual system must be also permitted under secure interoperation; and that any access not permitted within an individual system must be also denied under secure interoperation. ), in order to be assigned to the corresponding component subqueries. means that a query belonging to a federated user with the L23-L12a clearance level, has to be translated into a query tagged with L12 when it was passed to the CDB 1 . After that the MLFSS will need to filter the result to return only part of elements classified at L12 security level. The next section explains which modules of our MLFSS architecture take charge of these tasks. Figure 8 shows an example of the second special case. In this case, one of the two no comparable levels also has an equivalence relation with the security level of the other lattice, but the other one is dominated by the level of the other lattice (see fig. 8 .a). As in the first special case, the solution consists of splitting the set of elements classified at level L12, but in this case it is enough to only take a subset into account, just the subset L12a (see fig. 8 dominates L12, so these dominance relations form a path (see fig. 9 .a). As in the second special case, only considering the subset L12a is enough to solve the integration (see fig. 9 .b). 
The multilevel federated security system
Sections 3 and 4 of this paper describe a methodology to solve security heterogeneities when a federation of MLS CDBs is built. After the construction of the federation, there are different tasks to be performed in order to operate it. From a security point of view, the FDBMS and particularly the MLFSS has to ensure data confidentiality. Subsection 5.1 describes the architecture of our MLFSS, that is included into the FDBMS operation architecture, which takes charge of tasks related to access control during the operation of the federation, and at the same time completes our methodology to integrate MLS policies. On the other hand, subsection 5.2 covers other additional characteristics of our MLFSS.
Architecture of our MLFSS
Several submodules compose our MLFSS: the Security Controller, the Security Level
Translator and the Security Filter. Let's to see two examples taking the information shown in figure 7 and in table 1 into account. On the one hand, when a federated user, with L12 clearance level, wants to retrieve all data that he/she can access, the FDBMS has to send a query to each CDB/DBMS to obtain all data accessible by the federated user. To send the query to each CDB, the clearance level of the federated user used to tag the query has to be translated. The query sent to the CDB1 has to be tagged with the L12 clearance level. Given that in the CDB2 the L12 security level does not exist, two subqueries, the first one tagged with L23 and the second tagged with L22, are generated by the Security Level Translator submodule to be sent to the CDB2. The result of the federated query contains the union of all subresults from the CDBs. In this case, the result contains data related to Employees and Cars from both CDBs.
On the other hand, when a federated user with the L23-L12a clearance level wants to perform the same query described above; the FDBMS also has to send the query to each CDBs, but with some differences. Now, the query sent to the CDB2 has to be tagged with the L23 security level, and the query sent to the CDB1 has to be tagged with L12. In this case, because of L23-L12a is dominated by L12, the result obtained by the CDB1 contains data that is not accessible by users with L23-L12a clearance level. Consequently, the result from the CDB1 has to be filtered, by the Security Filter submodule, to eliminate data that do not belong to the Authorization Schema corresponding to the L23-L12a security level (specifically, data in Cars from CDB1). Finally, the result of the federated query contains data only related to Employees from both CDBs.
To finish this part, note that all schema levels with their classifications as well as all translation functions, needed by the MLFSS, are stored in the Directory.
Other additional characteristics
Although the previous subsection describes the most important aspects of the MLFSS, there are other characteristics that need to be commented.
First of all, we need to indicate that before a Federated Query arrives to the Security Controller, the Federated user that poses the Federated Query has to be identified and authenticated. These tasks are not performed by the FDBMS. Federated users will be identified by the system from which users access the federation. This system will also be responsible for authenticating user's identity. Then, the federation will append the user's identity to every subquery before sending them to corresponding CDBs. In spite of this, each CDB will decide to use or not use any additional identification process (as we noted in the previous subsection). In this case, the federated administrator has to give to the CDBs the list of the federated users with their clearance levels conveniently translated (see DBMSK in figure 10).
Another characteristic to note is that, at this stage, the federation supports read-only accesses. So, like other multilevel security systems, our MLFSS is built for applying simpleproperty in order to permit or deny any access.
Finally, maintaining the confidentiality of data is only possible if the MLFSS preserves the initial classification of the components of data schemas. Because each data schema component can come from a different CDB then our MLFSS disposes of the least granularity used by any CDB. In general, classification can be tuple-level or element-level, using the Relational model, and single-level or multi-level in object-oriented models. As we use BLOOM (an extended object-oriented model), as CDM of the federation, and single-level is a particular case of multilevel, our MLFSS uses multi-level classification. It is important to note that every component of an object has its own confidentiality level or, if none is defined, it takes by default the confidentiality level of the object. This granularity allows performing an accurate access control thru the federation so that the CDBs get rid of unauthorized accesses.
Related work
Several papers in the literature are related to secure authorized accesses during interoperation among heterogeneous DBs. Some of them work in the context of FDBMSs and in particular in tightly coupled FDBMSs. [JD94] , [JD96] and [DCdVS97] base their security systems on the DAC mechanisms; [Per93] , [TF97] use canonical security systems, that support both the DAC and MAC mechanisms, and [Osb00] protects interoperable accesses by means of a Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) system. As far as we know, only [IGQ94] and [BSS96] , apart from [DQS00] (that is related to loosely coupled using a mediator/wrapper approach), base the security system of the federation on a MLS system. Particularly, [IGQ94] presents an integration methodology to solve confidentiality conflicts produced when a federation is built. The methodology is also based on a technique to create a global data schema, but the security systems of the CDBs use MLS systems with identical accreditation ranges. The problem is reduced to the resolution of the classification of each object belonging to the global data schema.
On the other hand, [BSS96] describes techniques (a logic programming approach and a graph-based approach) to obtain a unified accreditation range through a way of combining different accreditation ranges that preserves a set of interoperation security constraints. In this case, these techniques use a predefined set of interoperation security constraints, but the paper does not indicate how they are obtained.
Although [DQS00] is related to loosely coupled systems, there are some relevant aspects related to our work. The paper includes a way to check the correctness (consistency, nonambiguity and nonredundancy) of the specifications of mappings between levels of an external application and levels of the sources. They also analyze inconsistencies by means of cycles and paths among security levels of different accreditation ranges. But in this case, the analysis is not performed between CARs; it is performed among the accreditation range of an external application, defined manually by a human integrator/administrator, and the accreditation ranges of the sources. Mappings among accreditation ranges also are determined by the same human integrator/administrator and in case they are incorrect, the human integrator/administrator has to propose some changes in order to obtain a correct solution.
Finally, [GQ96] shows a study of the problem of secure interoperation among heterogeneous systems. This study insists on the detection and resolution of the security breaches caused by the interoperation but without specifying which security policy is applied. It starts from the assumption that mappings among security attributes and among distinct heterogeneous security systems have been previously solved (for example by the administrator of the FDBMS).
Conclusions
In this paper we extend our methodology to integrate multilevel security policies, presented at [OS00] , that takes into account MLS CDBs that use total ordered sets as accreditation ranges, in order to integrate MLS CDBs that use lattices as accreditation ranges. The described methodology can also be used to integrate multilevel security policies using total or partial ordered sets. Using this methodology a semi-automatic process is obtained, and it only has to be supervised by the security administrator in order to validate it. As result, the accreditation range of the federation and translation functions between each CAR and the FAR are obtained. On the other hand, we also describe the architecture of our MLFSS, included in the operation architecture of our FDBMS, as well as other additional characteristics in order to show how data confidentiality is preserved by our MLFSS.
